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INFO RUCNCAN/ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1268
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0027
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0887
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 000372

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TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [NATO](#) [MOPS](#) [CA](#)
SUBJECT: CANADA: DISCORD OVER OSLO PROCESS AND NATO
INTEROPERABILITY

REF: A. STATE 24735
[1](#)B. E-MAIL BAKER-MATTEI MARCH 7
[1](#)C. FAX MATTEI-PICO MARCH 13
[1](#)D. OTTAWA 258
[1](#)E. 07 STATE 164503

Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (C/NF) Summary: Embassy discussions with Canadian officials March 11-12 regarding cluster munitions (CM) inter-operability revealed a worrisome lack of interagency coordination. It appears that the delegation head may be attempting more to burnish his own credentials with anti-landmine and anti-CM activists than to pursue inter-agency agreed-upon Canadian national interests. Canadian engagement in the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and the OP merits continued close scrutiny. End summary

DFAIT NATO Surprised

[1](#)2. (C/NF) Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) Senior NATO Policy Adviser Amy Galigan on March 11 expressed surprise by ref A demarche, reiterating that Canada's position was to protect interoperability. After reading ref B (apparently for the first time), Galigan remarked that DFAIT's non-proliferation experts must have been "free-lancing" in Wellington when they proposed a "time-limited deferral" to the application of Article 1(c) of the OP with respect to combined operations and activities with non-party states.

DND Committed to...Interoperability

[1](#)3. (C/NF) During a March 12 lunch hosted by the defense attache, Department of National Defence (DND) Arms and Proliferation Control Policy Director Claude LeBlanc and Senior NATO Policy Adviser Sarah Tarry both stressed that Canada is committed to garnering OP language that permits Canada-U.S. and Canada-NATO interoperability for an indefinite period of time. LeBlanc confirmed that officials had briefed up the chain of command on this issue, and predicted that Defence Minister MacKay would reject any agreement that inhibits Canada's ability to participate in NATO and other coalition operations. LeBlanc promised to

raise the matter directly with Canada's head of delegation (HOD) to the OP, Earl Turcotte.

HOD: Playing Both Sides Against Middle?

14. (C/NF) After listening to ref A points and reviewing ref B document, DFAIT Mine Action and Small Arms Director and HOD Turcotte told Pol/Miloff that interoperability is Canada's "biggest concern...and a red line issue" that could cause Canada to refuse to be party to the OP. He acknowledged that ref B text could "lead one to think" that Canada had been "playing both sides against the middle" at the OP in Wellington. Turcotte argued, however, that such a view would "overemphasize the importance of a food for thought paper" delivered during an informal brainstorming session. Further, he noted, the first paragraph of ref B makes it clear that the paper does not reflect, and can not prejudice, Canada's official position. When asked if it is common for Canadian delegations to submit papers that run counter to national policy, Turcotte responded, "my remarks to the plenary are Qpolicy, Turcotte responded, "my remarks to the plenary are what matter."

15. (C/NF) Canadian officials concluded after Wellington, Turcotte added, that, rather than resolve the problem, ref B would just kick it down the road. Turcotte remarked that he "took a pounding" in Wellington from NGOs and activists for raising difficult issues related to definitions of CM and interoperability in the plenary. To make the point, he shared a copy of his closing remarks to the OP plenary (ref C).

16. (C) Turning to the April CCW, Turcotte said he would like

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to discuss with U.S. experts their thinking on interoperability if "dumb clusters" are outlawed under the OP or the CCW, as well as to what extent they think the OP and the CCW can be "harmonized." He admitted that Canada would not want to see one member of NATO out of 26 operating outside agreed norms, and expressed interest in U.S. thinking about a possible "technical fix" to exempt "smart, accurate, and reliable" munitions from an OP ban.

Comment

17. (C/NF) It was troubling to learn that DND non-proliferation staff and DFAIT officials responsible for NATO affairs were not fully aware of the Canadian delegation's actions in Wellington. Turcotte's most senior DND delegation member is months from retirement and privately admits to "checking-out," while his legal adviser is a part-time JAG reservist who doubles as a professor and deputy director at Carlton University's Centre for Defense and Security Studies. Turcotte implied that this legal adviser had proposed, wrote, and submitted ref B against Turcotte's better judgment. Ref A demarche has likely now prompted Turcotte's colleagues at DFAIT, and his counterparts at DND, to pay closer attention to ensure his actions more accurately reflect Canadian policy. In his personal and previous professional life, Turcotte was one of the 'true believers' behind the Ottawa Treaty to ban landmines. Now in government, his ambivalence about the role he is to play in relation to the Oslo Process is palpable. Thus, Canadian engagement in the both the CCW and the Oslo Process merits continued close scrutiny.

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